Among recent and major publications on the doctrine of God, including Langdon Gilkey's Reaping the Whirlwind 1 and Hans Küng's Existiert Got fi, 2 a special place is due to Eberhard Jüngel's Gott als Geheimnis der Welt.
women who Uve inescapably in the rupture between being and time. Can that be done? Can his question be answered?
RENEWING THEOLOGY AND THOUGHT Jüngel asks how a suffering God can speak to us from a cross, healing the breach between being and time, and he pursues his question through a book that is gradually becoming as notorious for its intricacies and difficulty as it is for its substance. He begins by insisting that we must "be able to say what we are talking about when we talk ofGocT' (ix). The scope, focus, and context of his effort must then be clear. The scope is foundational, intended as a grounding for the rest of theology. Subsequently Jüngel explains that he expects a full "material dogmatics" to tell the story of God as mystery of the world. His current study is meant as a foundation for that narration, providing its fundamental conceptually. 9 The focus is on the man Jesus, with whose suffering and death the self-revealing God has identified God's reality so as to define God forever and for all: as love. Not only materially but formally, not just doctrinally but hermeneutically, Christian theology can only be a theologia crucifixi. (One should note, though not exaggerate, his diction; this is a theology of the Crucified, not simply of the cross.) Finally, the context is the controversy or conflict between theism and atheism, the former understood in what may be termed its classical sense, 10 the latter in a sense to which Jüngel considers Bonhoeffer in our time and Hegel in the early nineteenth century to have been especially sensitive. In this context, it is only with great care that Jüngel sets himself against the traditional idea of God; for it did preserve the truth that "No one has ever seen God" (Jn 1:18a). But he does set himself decisively against that idea; for it failed to honor sufficiently the path God has opened for us, since "the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, has made him known" (Jn 1:18b). (Again, Jüngel's diction is revealing; the Johannine exëgësato is translated with zur Sprache gebracht or "brought to expression" rather than with the more usual Kunde (von ihm) gebracht or "made known." Jüngel approaches his investigations through a first chapter on language, how God can be present in it, and why God is therefore thinkable. In an initial way he argues here that anyone who wishes to understand the crucified Jesus and his relation to Easter faith must understand God as one who speaks, who addresses humanity. This God is not necessary 9 GG Wxvff., 520, 534. 10 1 refer here to European theism since Descartes, without distinguishing it from process theology's neoclassical theism. Many of Jüngers concerns and positions parallel those of process thought, but he seems to have little contact with its major proponents. The Doctrine of the Trinity does make brief mention of Schubert Ogden (100, n. 151).
for the technical functioning of an autonomous world but is properly speaking "more than necessary." 11 Not necessary in secular terms or on the world's conditions, God must rather be understood as gratuitous origin. God's self-revealing being can be characterized as (1) without a ground of its own; (2) one that occurs, being as event; and (3) free, in a primordial sense. The classical metaphysical question posed by Leibniz and then again by Heidegger, "Why is there something, and not rather nothing?", becomes for Jüngel the place where talk about God naturally arises. Here the experience of the difference between being and nonbeing awakens a human anxiety that we ourselves cannot relieve, but of which we can be relieved. Such language, however, cannot reach God by itself; it must rather be reached by God. It is not we who move towards the ground or reason for being; the God who has no ground moves toward us. We do not come to God, God comes to us-and from nowhere else but from God.
Here we have two of Jüngel's key theses bearing on the relation between God and being in time. The first is more negative and interpretative, that God is not necessary but "more than necessary." The second is correspondingly positive and perhaps more substantial, that "God comes from God." 12 As we shall see, it is in the füll reality of love that both have their proper locus. As love, God is the one who decides between being and nonbeing-not only from outside or above their opposition but from the very midst of it. That God is love we know neither through speculation nor through accumulated experience but only from the Word of the cross (1 Cor 1:18; cf. Rom 1:16 f.). There alone is God to be found for us, a word proclaiming that in the crucified Jesus God exists with us in the fulness of God's essence, the unity of God's essence and existence being in this way exhibited and defined as love.
The thrust and design of Jüngel's investigations are made clear enough in these introductory reflections. Thereafter he will have a double focus: to think God anew and to think thinking anew. 13 Organizationally, this entails at each stage a critical review of modern approaches to these issues, followed by a constructive development from the author himself. 1 ] Cf. Unterwegs zur Sache 7 f. 12 While The Doctrine of the Trinity seeks principally to locate God's being in becoming, GGW is more concerned to conceive God's being as coming. The variation in formula accompanies, of course, a far more extended study in the latter book. Its significance is obscured, however, when the German kommen is translated as "proceed," with all its classical trinitarian overtones; this is precisely what occurs in "The Relationship between 'Economic' and Immanent' Trinity," Theology Digest 14 His own theology is a thought that does not "decide about" God's reality but "corresponds" to it. When revelation occurs, we are able to reflect on it. Because we are addressed, we can respond. Inasmuch as we have been addressed, we recognize ourselves as by nature address-able. Thus, as previously noted, the categories of word and revelation remain central. God is the one who speaks from God's own self, who comes to us in selfrevelation. Faith is our answer to God and to ourselves. And as one might expect, there are niceties of the German language which can scarcely be reproduced in English. When the Word is given, theology's task is nachdenken, which ordinarily means "reflect" or "meditate" but here in a special way "thinking after," with inevitable overtones of discipleship. Likewise, it is God's speaking to us or address (ansprechen) which enables our response or correspondence (entsprechen). I might add, however, that I find none of these locutions strained-which cannot always be said of Jüngel's master in language, who conceived language as "the house of Being."
THOUGHT THAT FOLLOWS FAITH
After this introduction, God as Mystery of the World proceeds through four lengthy chapters. There is, first, a retrieval of the theological significance of talk about the death of God; then an extensive inquiry into whether God can be thought; next a discussion of how we may speak of God; finally, the study culminates in Jüngel's presentation on the humanity of God. He indicates that he is proceeding according to the stages of our own learning or discovery, rather than according to a synthetic exposition from the heart of the matter outwards; his chapters follow one aftother, as he says, secundum rationem cognoscendi rather than secundum rationem essçndi.
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The chapter on the idea of the death of God (55-137) understands that expression as a telling indication of the aporia of modern thought concerning God. Jüngel exposes a twofold origin for the fateful pronouncement of God's death: the metaphysical concept of God itself and authentic Christian faith in God. Put synthetically, he sees the radical critique of theism as the presupposition for the modern metaphysics of finite subjectivity, with its clear opposition between finite and infinite. But this radical critique of theism is grounded in Christian faith itself. As Bonhoeffer and Hegel each in his own way saw so well, genuine faith can never have wholly forgotten that the Bible directs us to the powerlessness and suffering of God, that God has come to us and saved us-on a cross.
The next chapter (138-306), asking whether God can be thought, comprises a small book in itself and recapitulates years of effort on Jüngel's part to bring the terms "thought" and "God" together. The fundamental critical and historical contention is that modern thought beginning with Descartes sought to establish its own foundation, to ground itself, in a way that led ineluctably to the destruction of all metaphysically established certainty about God. Through Descartes's use of doubt as a method and his appeal to God's necessity, an inversion of the true relation between God and humanity took place: the former became a function of the latter; for while God's essence was conceived as above the finite and independent of it, God's existence was guaranteed only inasmuch as it was represented as an object of the subjective ego.
In a series of perhaps overrefined analyses, Jüngel draws upon Fichte, Feuerbach, and Nietzsche for further evidence that a metaphysically conceived concept of God was no longer viable for a modernity seeking to ground itself in its own processes of thought. Dismembering the prevalent idea of God was an achievement of emancipated subjectivity. Nietzsche was its eloquent prophet and spoke, in an ironic way, quite to our author's purposes: 18 Second, God's advent in language allows human beings, through their faith in that advent, to correspond not only to God's true self but to their own true selves, renouncing their own self-grounding. Third, God's coming occurs inasmuch as God identifies with the human struggle between being and nonbeing.
Jüngel admits that he has presuppositions when he says that the word is the place where God comes and can be thought. But he thinks these are the presuppositions of any genuinely evangelical theology, since such a theology must proceed from basic hermeneutic decisions: that God can only be thought on God's terms; that this is possible only on the basis of a unique experience of God in Christ; and that the biblical expression of this experience remains normative. God must be understood as the one who speaks of God's own accord; only inasmuch as God comes to us can we say that God is. Furthermore, the essence of the Word by which we are addressed, as of any word of address, is that it draws near and approaches us through interrupting. A word of address in genuine dialogue is the element which assures an experience of temporal "distanciation" and "distention" in the dialogue; it is more genuinely temporal than the mere sequence of words expressed. In this sense, as one who addresses us while breaking into and expanding our time, God can be understood to become truly present to that time while remaining also absent. There is not a mere alternation of presence and absence, but a co-penetration of the two which more accurately describes biblical experience as well as religious experience in general.
If which has past and future and a position which has distance and proximity. Through opening human reality in this way, language allows God to approach us in time, to come so near to us in our experience of temporal distention, in fact, that we may truly come to rely on God, trust in God, let God be there for us in all God's newness. In this way, faith becomes that self-determination of human beings in which, let be by God, they can renounce their own self-grounding. The certainty (Gewissheit) of faith thus becomes one that releases (entsichern) us rather than binding (sicherstellen) or securing us. The analysis, needless to say, is more subtle than any summary can indicate; its ambition is nothing less than an ontological translation of the Pauline (and classically Lutheran) conviction that faith is a trust in God's grace rather than in our own works.
But if God so enters time, must there not be a greater unity between God and time than we have usually thought? Jüngel argues that a biased analysis of transience and the transitory has prevented us from answering the question as true faith would suggest. For the metaphysical tradition, the temporality of the transitory was considered its negative element. In fact, however, it would be more adequate to say that what is negative in the transitory is its tendency toward nothingness. For this we have radical "ontological similes" in such experiences as death and loss. In contrast to the negative element in the transitory, its tendency to nothingness, we may say that its ontologically positive element is its possibility. Clearly this analysis suggests a basic revision in the way philosophers and theologians since Aristotle have evaluated the relation between actuality and possibility.
19 Jüngel considers that we are led to the revision ineluctably, and again by a twofold necessity: the historicity of consciousness on the one hand and the experience of faith on the other. He is also able to suggest effective basic definitions for the transitory and for nothingness: the former is the capacity for becoming, the latter the incapacity to become. Every transitory or historical reality would thus be accurately described as a struggle between being and nonbeing. God, confessed by faith to have identified God's self with this struggle, would be found nowhere else but in the midst of it. As the infinitely suffering one (our great "fellow sufferer," as Whitehead would say), God is the being for others, entering the struggle between being and nonbeing, between life and death, in a way that defines God's own reality and for which only one word is adequate: love. Here Jüngel at once retrieves and renews an ancient conception of God as "overflowing being" (überströ-mendes Sein 302 ff.). God is the one who goes-out-of-God-into-nothing-ness, who ex-ists into nothingness. By conceiving God in this way the author maintains that he has come to think God's essence as existence. "The existing which is identical with the essence of godhead means: a se in nihilum ek-sistere" (303).
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SPEAKING OF THE HUMANITY OF GOD
In the previous discussion, which moved forward in terms of discovery rather than of synthetic presentation, Jüngel was considering, first critically and then constructively, how God may be thought. The presupposition throughout is that faith has been addressed by God and corresponds to that address. Prompted by the language of faith, reason is led to ask how it can think of God; it "follows after" (denkt nach) faith. For Jüngel, the reciprocal priorities of the learning process and the process of reality itself are not mere matters of fact; they are ontological. Language is ontologically prior to thought. In our effort to think of God appropriately, we recognize more profoundly the dependence of all thought on language. This leads to the next main section of the book, concerning the possibility of speaking of God (307-408). That we do in fact speak of God in the world presupposes God's ontological priority to the world. And this priority leads to the final phase of the author's investigations, and his most personal contribution, on the humanity of God (409-543).
Critically, Jüngel's study of how God may be spoken begins with John Damascene's classic formulation that "the divine is unspeakable and incomprehensible." Tracing the influence of this view through to Thomas Aquinas, Jüngel finds that it implies a concept of God's mystery which is too negative; he also disagrees with the priority the view gives to thought over language. 21 Such an approach leads inevitably, he thinks, to a hermeneutic self-elimination of language and a silence about God which is enforced, through linguistic excess, in the "way of eminence." God is presented as infinitely superior to every predicate available to us. In contrast, Jüngel prefers a more positive understanding of mystery, inspired by the New Testament, a mystery that can be communicated in speech, a "speaking" or self-revealing mystery.
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Constructively, this introduces the problem of analogical speech. Aristotle is shown to have had two basic models: a rhetorical one used to 20 In earlier sections of GGW Jüngel had been concerned to show the difficulties consequent on the modern distinction between God's existence and essence. For a similar point, in contrast to Aquinas, see Rahner, "Observations" 139. 21 See GGW 343 ff., 352 ff., 372 f., 410. 22 Jüngel agrees with the centrality of mystery in Rahner's thought but wants himself to understand it still more evangelically; see GGW 341, nn. 10 and 11. A profitable study still remains to be done on the recovery of the concept of mystery in other twentieth-century thinkers such as Heidegger, Marcel, and Bloch. explain metaphor (the analogy of proportionality), then a logical one used to explain various uses of the same word (analogy of attribution or proportion). For Aquinas, in his discussion of analogical predication about God, there are fundamentally two types of the analogy of attribution: first the analogy "of many to one," then that "of one to another." 23 The notion of causality permeates each author's analysis of how the divine may be named, as it later does Kant's approach. God is thought as related to the world through causality rather than through love. 24 For faith, however, there is a more creative and gratuitous origin for analogical language-in love. Jüngel proposes to understand the gospel as the human word that corresponds (entspricht) to the mystery of God's love. In contrast to the classical analogy of names, which expresses the unknowability of God and sees God as the wholly other, he urges an "analogy of advent," the gospel as the event of correspondence. Precisely because God has shown God's self to be human and linguistic, the model of speech can be applied to God. For all the difference between God and humanity, and in the very midst ofthat difference, there has appeared an ever greater similarity: Jesus as the parable of God. 25 Instead of speaking of the ever-greater difference between God and whatever we may say about God, we are drawn to ever greater anticipation of the kingdom of God and to ever greater absorption in Jesus as the way the kingdom comes to us. God's self-revelation in Jesus opens our eyes to see a new relation established between God and the world; it frees our tongues to speak with a new truth about the most ordinary realities of life (a lost coin, a treasure in a field) which now correspond to the way God addresses our world with inexhaustible love. The subject of a parable becomes concretely present through the language itself of the parable; parables are linguistic events that let something happen. But God can only happen in them because God has freely chosen to be expressed among us, has come near and shown God's innermost reality to be human and to have the Word.
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The claim, of course, is at once bold and quite familiar. How can we say that God is truly human? But what happens to incarnational faith if we do not say that? If we are to speak of the humanity of God, furthermore, does this mean that we may also speak correlatively of humanity's divinity, or at least divinization? (On this last question, as we shall see, Jüngel seems closer to his Tübingen colleague Hans Küng than to the tradition of the Greek Fathers.
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) Whereas Jüngel's discussion of analogy had been chiefly hermeneutic, the final chapter of his book pursues an ontological formulation for analogical language's grasp of the ever-greater similarity within the dissimilarity between God and humanity. This closing chapter proceeds in four stages. First, it considers the humanity of God as a history that must be told. Second, it reflects on the identity of God and love. Third, it examines how Jesus Christ is the "vestige" of the trinitarian God. Fourth, it presents a summary of trinitarian theology. The unifying thesis is that God's humanity comes from the being of God, which can only be properly thought as love, a love in turn that can only be adequately expressed in trinitarian terms.
In considering God's history as a story that must be told, and repeatedly told, Jüngel joins but also distinguishes himself from the current interest in narrative theology. 28 Developing his position on the priority of language over thought, he argues for a primordial unity of language and time. (The German word for "verb," one recalls, is Zeitwort) As God's being is in coming to us, so human speech is the dynamic location in which the flow of time reaches us most immediately and where God most centrally enters our experience. Thus the idea of God can only be thought as an account of God's history with us. Narration is the form of speech that corresponds to history; it is not simply a limitation of human thought that it tells stories of God but rather God's own self that requires to be narrated. However, the narration of God's history, which is equivalent to a narration of God's being, requires the counterpart of critical reflection on the relations between history and such structural elements of history as possibility and actuality, freedom and necessity. In order to be genuinely narrative, theology must understand what it means by narration; it must know not only what is linguistically characteristic of story-telling but also what is particularly characteristic of the story it uniquely has to tell. For Jüngel, then, there is a reciprocal interdependence between narration and argument in theology, between story-telling and dialectic, discursive thought. 29 With this significant proviso, he agrees that it is God's humanity, God's coming to us, that "theology has to tell." To tell this history, however, is to tell what God is. And this can only mean to tell of God's love.
Love must be understood here not as "something about God" but rather as God's very definition. In a subtle and impressive argument across time with Ludwig Feuerbach, Jüngel shows that God and love must be identified as subject and predicate which mutually interpret each other. Faith, however, must be clearly distinguished from love if it is to remain the basis for our confidence in God as love and for our capacity to" distinguish God and humanity concretely. 30 The experience of faith prompts us to reflect on our first or prior understanding of love. In the genuine experience of love, suggests the author, there is a new grasp of what is meant by selfhood, by being and having, and also by life and death. Any genuine love, though it is surely self-related, is still more surely self-less; even as the awareness of self grows, the forgetfulness of self has already advanced beyond it. What one has in love, above all, is what one has given away; what one has, most strikingly, is devotion to the beloved. 31 One's truest and fullest life in love, then, depends on and comes from the beloved; in love one gives one's life for the sake of another and, in the extreme case, gives up that life entirely, dying for the life of the other.
Jüngel thus discovers in the very essence of love a dialectic of being and nonbeing. From the self-surrender of love we have our clearest 29 Here again Barth is the acknowledged master, as GGW427, n. 52, notes. Karl Rahner might also be appropriately quoted: "theology (or better and more precisely faith ... ) should always speak what is the historically concrete in its underivability and precisely while doing that make intelligible that this concreteness of history can really concern human beings in their ultimate existence and subjectivity" ("Reflections on Methodology in Theology," experience of receiving new being. In being given unexpectedly new life by someone we love, we live "from" that person. In the risk of love, in fact, we come close to death in a way that profound reflection on human eros has so often recognized-for we might not be loved. To be "from the other" brings us powerlessly before the potential of nonbeing-powerlessly because the power of love is precisely powerless before all that is not love. But to the extent that the possibility of not being appears, there appears more surely still the new self that is constituted by the new nearness of an I and a Thou. Jüngel has a trenchant twofold formula for this dialectic. It translates ontologically his hermeneutic insight into analogy as the recognition of an ever-greater similarity within the dissimilarity between God and humanity. Formally, he proposes, there is in the midst of any self-relatedness, however great, an ever-greater self-lessness. Materially, this is expressed by saying that in love an event of unity occurs between life and death-for the sake of life. According to the word of the cross, this dialectic of love is the very truth about God. It is God's essence to exist through the giving of God's own life; God is the one whose life takes death upon itself-for the sake of life. What we may suspect of love in our general experience proves to be God's own definition. But "faith alone experiences and knows God as event, subject, and object of love in one, and therefore as love, beloved, and realization of love in indissoluble unity." 32 Faith alone knows that there is such a bond of love between God and God's Word that humanity can be drawn into God through this bond of the Spirit. It is thus our faith through which we become open to God's humanity, recognizing the difference between ourselves and God, and recognizing at the same time that our task is not to become God but rather to become more truly human. We can also put the point another way. While faith in the humanity of God is our evidence for the identity of God and love, this faith correspondingly displays or unfolds its evidential character through believing in God as Father, Son, and Spirit. It is the task of theology, accordingly, to make explicit the identity of God and love in trinitarian terms. At the end of Jüngel's long pursuit of the question how God's word from the cross can be heard addressed to being and time, we are invited to recognize God's love as the mystery of our world. As love freely given on our behalf and eternally faithful to its purpose, God's mystery shows itself to be the eternal possibility of our world's history.
From the previous discussion one might expect that Jüngel would not look to natural or creaturely vestigia trinitatis in order to ground his doctrine of the Trinity. It is rather the particular and unique human history through which God has addressed us and come to our world, namely, the history of Jesus, that constitutes for him the only genuine vestigium trinitatis. While God's historicity may be expressed by saying that God's being is in coming, God's history consists in God's coming to humanity. This coming occurs in the life and especially the death of Jesus, through which the tension between eternal life and death is taken up by God. To think this story coherently, however, requires a new way of understanding God. death to eternal life. 35 * It remains for Jüngel to complete his investigations by stating his trinitarian thought not only in these soteriological terms but also in ontological ones. He can then conclude by showing briefly how faith, hope, and charity are the human acts and modes of being which correspond to God's being in its movement towards humanity. Of special interest here, I think, are the ontological formulations through which Jüngel indicates in trinitarian language how God can be conceived as the one whose being is in coming. To put it as summarily as possible, the mysterium trinitatis is "that God is, inasmuch as God comes to God's self-from God to God as God." 36 First, God comes from God, is God's own origin ( Ursprung)', biblically expressed, God is Father. Second, God comes to God, is God's own goal (Ziel); put biblically, God is Son. Third, God comes as God, is God's own mediation (Vermittlung); biblically, God is also Spirit. In more explicitly temporal terms, God may be said to be the one who was to come, who comes, who is to come, 37 in God alone are past, present, and future so fully united that temporality is at once real and reconciled. As God's unoriginated originality allows both being and nonbeing to flow from God, God's gift of God's self (through the Son) in union with God's self (in the Spirit) provides the ultimate model ( Urbild) for being in time and also the means for its final consummation (ewiges Leben).
UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
I hope this account of Jüngel's doctrine of God has given some sense of its depth and also of its daring. There can be no doubt that he has significantly enriched Christian theology not only by mining the traditions of faith and philosophy for their deepest resources but also by contemplating the gospel with such sensitivity to its future prospects. Even if Jüngel's efforts are not fully successful, he stands out in his i5a Cf. this remarkable passage in Barth's Church Dogmatics 2/1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957) 274: "to understand God, we must now say that He wills to be ours, and He wills that we should be His. He wills to belong to us and He wills that we should belong to Him. He does not will to be without us, and He does not will that we should be without Him. He wills certainly to be God and He does not will that we should be God. But He does not will to be God for Himself nor as God to be alone with Himself. He wills as God to be for us and with us who are not God." ib GGW 522. As previously noted, it seems best here to translate kommen as "comes" rather than "proceeds," so as to avoid confusion with the language both of the ancient Church and of contemporary process theology. 37 Cf. GGW 532: "Das Kommen, in dem Gottes Sein ist, ist also selber Gott. Dieses Kommen ist aber erst dann in seiner Vollkommenheit gedacht, wenn es als Herkunft, Ankunft und Zukunft begriffen ist" (my emphasis). generation as the most consistent, thorough representative of dialectical, neo-orthodox thought, a theology whose contribution to the Church in our century is permanent. While in the cast of his mind Jüngel may remind one of Karl Barth among Protestant theologians or Hans Urs von Balthasar among Catholics, 38 the intricacy of his philosophical analyses is reminiscent of Martin Heidegger or the German idealists. Interpreting the tradition of Barth and Bultmann, Langdon Gilkey has written that they saw the task of theology as "a hermeneutical one: the interpretation and understanding of the scriptures, or the translation of that Word into language appropriate and intelligible today." 39 It is a special contribution on Jüngel's part to have discerned an equally basic task, namely, how we can possibly think the God who reveals God's self in the Word.
A good many questions of detail can be posed to Jüngel's work. His interpretation of key authors such as Hegel and Barth will be debated by some. His exegetical principles show relatively exclusive reliance on German sources. His views of the modern process of secularization might well be qualified, and so might his analysis of ontological necessity. It is not clear, to me at least, whether he is proposing a strictly social analogy for the Trinity, along the lines of Heribert Mühlen, whom he cites several times approvingly; he may be content simply to share Mühlen's insight that the Trinity contains at once the greatest unity and the greatest differentiation. 40 In addition, Jüngel acknowledges the unsettled character of his thought on the ultimate relationship between narrative and systematic theologies. Personally, I doubt that the issue can be settled in terms of narrative and conceptual modes of discourse alone; a genuine theology of history will very likely be required to mediate between both these types.
But let me turn to some unresolved aspects of Jüngel's more central concerns. If I question the solutions at which he arrives, I should also note that theology today is too unsettled for anyone to be surprised if ambiguities persist in the thought of even its most distinguished proponents. Theologians are struggling to reinterpret the gospel in a postmodern culture that is more concerned with its own identity and goals than with the debate between atheism and theism. Countless Christians are looking to identify anew the cross of Jesus and the power of his resurrection, seeking to find the God of Jesus in our common human anguish. In this common effort it is imperative to raise the sort of questions Jüngel has addressed. But it is also predictable that our soundings of these questions, even after years of study, will long remain provisional. Let me conclude, then, by posing with a similar provisionally three interconnected questions relating to Jüngel's thought on God. First, is God really the origin of being and time, or is God not rather that being of perfect love from whom originate beings in time? Second, is God's Word addressed to all of human history, or only to some of it? Third, if being and time are finally to be reconciled through God's Word to the world, what is the relation between God's love and God's power in effecting that reconciliation?
For the first question, the central ontological notion in Jüngel's thought is, as we have seen, that God is "overflowing being." In his search for a dynamic conception of God, Jüngel subordinates the division between being and time, and also the division between being and nonbeing, to the prior conception of God as superabundant existence for the other. God is thus understood as the one who goes forth even into nothingness-not from any necessity but rather in the free sharing which love alone defines ("more than necessary"). Asking whether God must redeem creation, or whether God must share God's own life with humanity, Jüngel answers that the question should rather be: What does God freely choose to do? To this he replies that God freely wills not to love God's self apart from humanity. Philosophically, Jüngel is here appropriating the thesis, common to authors such as Schelling and Tillich, that in God being is eternally overcoming nonbeing. In other words, there is a dialectical negativity in God's own self. Evangelically, Jüngel rejects as simply "godless" such questions as whether God is conceivable apart from the world or, in alternate terms, whether it can make any sense, given our world, to say that the world's redeeming creator could exist without it. Granted the struggle between being and nonbeing which unfolds in time, and granted the origin of this dialectic in God's love itself, only God's Word could reach and so penetrate being and time as to heal their breach. A breach occurs when being begins in time; its redeemed end becomes possible only through and with the eternal life which is God's.
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Skilful as this argument may be, and sensitive as it is to the ontological structure of historical consciousness, it remains in my view unresolved. In passing, it again raises doubts as to why Jüngel on the one hand insists that God's humanity makes it possible for us to become genuinely human but on the other hand denies that communion with God implies in any way a divinization or a share in what God is. 42 More centrally, however, Jüngel seems to concentrate on the actual mystery of grace to such aft extent that he is blinded to what can be learned from reflection on the mystery of nature's possibility. In his effort to think how God actually wishes to be with humanity, most especially on the cross of Jesus, he seems unnecessarily to exclude thinking how creation and redemption, while intimately related in the actual order, are each in its own way entirely gratuitous. It has traditionally been argued that God cannot save the world except through freely suffering love, but that neither can the world continue to exist except through a God who is sufficient unto God's own self. Precisely this point remains ambiguous when Jüngel refuses to speak of God's being "an und für sich" and yet on the same page states that "precisely inasmuch as God is enough for God's own self is God being in abundance, is God's overflowing being expression of God's grace, the prototype of God's covenant with a partner that is not God, that first of all in fact does not exist at all but must precisely be created as a partner of God: humanity."
43 By not asking whether any creation by God must be a covenanted creation, Jüngel loses a valuable perspective on the bipolar gratuity of God's creative love and redemptive suffering for our actual world. At the very least, one would also expect him to address explicitly the classical question whether the world has a beginning in time-especially since he does speak clearly, though tersely, of the end of the world's time. This issue, of course, has a long history in theological discussion, especially in Protestant and Catholic polemics. In abbreviating it, Jüngel unfortunately abbreviates as well his effort to think of God as the holy love who speaks and suffers in a saving way for us. And there are many reasons for wishing his effort to succeed. If it did, it would have much to contribute not only toward answering Heidegger's question of being but also toward recovering a genuinely theological conception of revelation.
A second unresolved issue arises from Jüngel's conception of the Word and history. In brief, is God's saving Word effectively addressed to all or only to some of human history? Many critics will find that Jüngel has exaggerated his thesis on the origin of history in language. Even on his own terms, however, the position contains a basic ambiguity. To the extent that language fundamentally expresses our historical nature by opening past and future for the present, there is a universal relation between human language throughout history and the One in whom the transcendently true word of love is to be found. Indeed, Jüngel does refer to humanity at one point as "a sigh for being of another sort that is unmistakably and wholly love." 44 Nevertheless, he grants such longing for God only a postulatory character and otherwise maintains a strictly particularist position, restricting the appearance of God's saving truth uniquely to the history of Jesus. The Word which on the one hand gives rise to all of history, on the other hand seems to redeem only a distinct part of it. Far more important than questions about Jüngel's excessive concentration on language, with his consequent neglect of other forms of the symbolic character of human life, this issue of the universalism or particularism of God's Word affects one's conception of God as centrally as it does one's conception of humanity's justification.
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Jüngel seems to me correct in saying that human beings do not inaugurate their search for God independently of God's already actual presence, or apart from God (Deo remoto, as he says). For the community of Christian faith, the most real aspect of its experience is indeed the advent of God in even the most troubled times of its life. But such faith can also come to the reasonable conclusion that God's coming takes place throughout all of human life; it can recognize that the story of Jesus reveals what God's loving intention for humanity has always been and will always be, namely, a lasting communion with God's own self and thereby with one another. Jüngel oversimplifies his argument when he says that a search for God can be conducted only after a historically identified revelation. He seems to presume that it is pointless to speak of anything like a natural knowledge of God unless one prescinds from grace-gratia remota, so to speak. But it is not necessary, in order to conceive the human question about God as a constituent of human being, to conceive it as chronologically prior to any answer of God's. With Tillich and Rahner, one may understand our human questioning as called into being precisely by the Word of God which alone can fully satisfy our hearts. 46 not a significant figure in GGW. Jüngel acknowledges, however, that the book is limited to "an implicit conversation" with Rahner (GGW 357, n. 1; note the polemical closing remark which overlooks later and more developed ecumenical strains in Rahner). If this conversation were to become more explicit, it would have to ask whether Rahner's Hörer des Wortes, even in the context of its original presentation, can be adequately read as a purely "natural" philosophy of religion. Consid-turely presupposition for God's redemptive goal of seeking us-even at the cost of the cross. The seeking for God found everywhere in human culture takes place genuinely and ineluctably even before a revelation of God is identified in a clearly historical way. It occurs, however, not because we first conceive a natural desire for God, but because God's desire for us conceives us as beings open by nature to God's own life and indeed as destined,by grace to pass through death itself to that very life. It is not a "competitive" version of divine truth but the common destiny of humanity that is fully and finally realized in the death and resurrection of Jesus. The gospel, God's word to history, can therefore be appreciated in its particularity only to the extent that one appreciates as well its universal power of assimilation or integration, its call to an unrestricted community of dialogue among all human beings and with their God. Where once, more classically, we may have spoken of Christ as the concrete universal of love, today we may say, more historically, that through him a new humanity for God becomes possible, one in which all times can take part and about which every tongue can tell.
The final question I raise in appreciation of Jüngel's theology concerns the relation between love and power in God. With great consistency and conviction, Jüngel insists on conceiving God as love rather than as almighty sovereignty. Throughout his theology he turns from the allpowerful and immutable sovereign to the suffering and truly dying servant. His analyses of the relation between love and power tend to focus typically on interpersonal relations, but he recognizes the social dimension and can speak eloquently of the community with God and humanity that is made possible by the life of Jesus. In the preaching of Jesus, as he had written earlier in Paulus und Jesus, the power of the kingdom of God becomes concrete as the power of love. 47 In Gott als Geheimnis, God's dominion is so subordinated to God's love that it can be spoken of only as the power of love; love has only love with which to defend itself.
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Here Jüngel joins company with the moving reflection on God's powerlessness that one finds in Bonhoeffer and, more recently, Gutiérrez. But he parts company with another tradition represented in our own country by Reinhold Niebuhr and, among his students, Langdon Gilkey. For these latter theologians, the gospel of love is also intrinsically a gospel of justice, ering Rahner's thesis that in the present and graced order of the world "nature" must be considered an analytic concept (Restbegriff) rather than a directly experienced reality, one might also ask whether Rahner thinks in terms of a purely "natural" analogy of being or whether it is not rather an analogy of graced being that is central to his thought. In this regard, e.g., it would help to relate carefully pp. 72 f. and 119 f. in Foundations. 47 and any concentration on God's love that minimizes God's judgment and justice ends by diminishing the force of that gospel. Love may be the heart of Christianity, but it is not its entire body. A full foundational theology needs to pay far more attention to the social conditions of inequality and injustice in which and for which the word of God's love is proclaimed. Such theology can learn more from Third World theologians, I think, than Jüngel's rather polemical view permits. But it can learn also from other traditions, such as the one I mention, a tradition that knows the distinction between power as domination and power as empowerment and one that has experienced through political process as well as through church life that "passive suffering is no substitute for active and freely held power."
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If God has chosen to come among us and make God's love ours, there must indeed be something like a humanity in God which all too many philosophers have ignored. The Greek tradition speaks in this vein of the condescension of God. John Macquarrie has aptly called it the humility of God. Eberhard Jüngel is persuasive in his own way when he suggests that an infinitely caring God is willing to bear infinite suffering. But when he prescinds from the issue of power, I fear that he risks a new theological romanticism insensitive to the abuses of power that so desperately deform our world. Jüngel's doctrine of God is masterful in its approach to God's vulnerable suffering, but it seems less able to include in its course the sufferings that are imposed on so many of God's people. In that respect this fine theologian shows signs of the same pallor that afflicts much of mainstream theology today. If it is not able to speak with more depth about the passion undergone by our time, then neither will it be able to speak with complete conviction about the passion undergone by God.
